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THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
COURT; REPORT OF THE ASSOCIA-

TION'S COMMITTEE

Hon. John H. Denison,
Presidentof the Denver Bar Association.

Dear President Denison:
Your Committee on the question of whether the United
States should adhere to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, through ratification by the Senate, of the act of President Hoover in directing the signing at Geneva of the Protocol of Adherence, the Protocol of the Statute of the Court,
and the Protocol of Revision of the Statute, is now ready to
report.
The conclusion of the Committee favors the ratification.
The reasons follow:
The Permanent Court of International Justice, or, as it
is more commonly known, the World Court, was chartered
and organized in 1921, under an international Statute drafted
in 1920, and subscribed to by many States in a document called
the Protocol of Signature.
Since organization, the Court, composed of eminent
judges, has been functioning steadily, has decided sixteen international cases, rendered sixteen advisory opinions, and has
grown rapidly in world esteem.
The Court has jurisdiction, under Article XXXVI of
the Statute,FIRST: Of all cases which the disputing States refer to it by special
agreement, and all matters which their general treaties and conventions likewise provide shall be referred.
SECOND: Of certain classes of legal disputes, the submission of
which, when arising, is agreed upon in advance at the time of subscribing to
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the Protocol of Signature (the Protocol adopting the charter Statute of the
Court), by electing to accept, although there is no obligation to elect, certain
provisions of the Protocol imposing this submission. Many of the States, by
their election, have accepted this compulsory jurisdiction,--others have not.
The United States, if adhering, would adhere as a State of this latter class.

The Court is further empowered by Article XIV of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, to render advisory opinions to and at the request of either the Council or the Assembly
of the League of Nations upon any dispute or. question thus
requested, and after adopting appropriate rules, has been
exercising this advisory function, although the Protocol of
Signature has nothing to say about advisory opinions. The
Protocol for the Revision of the Statute, is designed to effect
in the Statute certain changes, among which are those supplying the advisory jurisdiction lacking in the older Statute, and
also harmonizing the Statute with the Protocol of Adherence,
which is the principal international agreement by which, if
ratified by the Senate, the United States would enter the Court.
In view of the fact that for the time being at any rate,
the United States has adopted the policy of co-operation with,
rather than membership in, the League of Nations, the wisdom
of adherence by this country to the World Court would seem
to depend upon two questions:
(1) Whether the other States which are members of the Court have
now complied with the reserved conditions upon which if accepted by the
other members of the Court, our Senate declared in 1926 that it would be
willing to see the United States adhere.
(2) Upon whether there is anything in the adherence to the Court,
which, either through the Protocol of Adherence, or through the Covenant
of the League of Nations, would subject the United States to the League.
SENATE RESERVATIONS

These famous reservations are five in number:
The first reservation is to the effect that the adherence of
the United States to the Court shall not involve -any legal
relation to the League of Nations, or the assumption of any
obligations by the United States under the treaty of Versailles.
While this reservation is not accepted by the Protocol of
Adherence in specific language, it is accepted in the general
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language of the Introduction and of Article I, relating to all
five of the reservations.
The second reservation demands a right of participation
by the United States in the election of the Judges who comprise the Court, these Judges now being elected by a concurring majority of the Council and of the Assembly of the
League, voting separately. This demand is met specifically
by Article II of the Protocol of Adherence, and under it the
United States, although not a member of the League, would,
for the purpose of electing Judges, have the same right to
vote as if a member.
The third reservation contemplates that the determination of what share of the expenses of the Court should be borne
by the United States shall be made by the Congress of the
United States itself. Compliance with this reservation is to
be found in the general language of acceptance in the Introduction of the Protocol of Adherence and in Article I.
In the fourth reservation the Senate stipulates that the
United States be permitted at any time to withdraw its adherence to the Court, and that the charter Statute under which
the Court was created, shall not be amended without the consent of the United States. The right of withdrawal is completely provided for in Article VIII of the Protocol of Adherence and the right to veto any amendment of the charter
Statute is fully conceded by Article III.
The fifth reservation is the one which has given the most
trouble. This reservation is to the effect that,-( 1) the Court
shall not render advisory opinions except publicly, after notice to all States belonging to the Court, and after public
hearings or opportunity for public hearings is given to all
States concerned, and also, that,-(2) the Court shall not,
without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has, or claims an interest.
Under the present governing laws of the Court, advisory
opinions may be called for only by the Council or by the Assembly of the League of Nations, and not by individual
States. The Court has rendered sixteen. such opinions already. They are considered of great value to the States
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belonging to the Court. They tend, among other things, to
avert a crisis between States before it becomes acute. While
advisory opinions, being advisory, are not binding, they nevertheless, carry great moral weight. To provide for the desired
publicity has been easy enough, but to find a formula that
would satisfy the United States in its desire to possess a veto
power to prevent rendition of an advisory opinion on any
matter in which the United States might have or claim an
interest and at the same time not destroy wholly this useful
function of the Court for the remaining States which do not
ask for any similar veto power, has been a difficult problem.
Article IV of the Protocol of Adherence complies with
the publicity demand by providing irrevocably what the rules
of the Court already provided revocably, namely, that advisory opinions shall be rendered only in public session of
the Court after notice and after opportunity to be heard publicly.
Article V of the Protocol goes even further in respect to
the right of the United States to be heard as to advisory opinions than demanded by the Senate itself, for this Article provides that even before a request is made upon the Court for
an advisory opinion, and while the proposed request is still
pending in the Council or Assembly of the League, notice shall
be given to the United States so that there may be an exchange
of views between the United States and the Council or Assembly as the case may be, on the question of whether or not
an interest of the United States would be affected by an advisory opinion on the subject matter of the proposed request.
In respect to the desire for a veto power, it may be said
that most questions for which an advisory opinion would besought probably would be questions in which the United
States neither would have nor claim an interest. This has
been true as to all sixteen of the advisory opinions thus far
rendered. Again, if by chance the question involved in the
proposed advisory opinion should happen, to be one in which
the United States has or claims an interest, the Government
might be perfectly willing to have an advisory opinion rendered upon it, and even might join in the request. If, however, it should turn out that the United Stites not only has
or claims to have an interest, but persists in its insistence that
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no opinion should be rendered, then, as provided under Article
V of the Protocol, the United States could exercise its expressly reserved power of withdrawal from the Court "without any imputation of unfriendliness or unwillingness to cooperate generally for peace and good will." Thus the formula by which the Protocol solves the problems of the fifth reservation is of such a nature that the Court could not, while the
United States is a member of it, render an advisory opinion
on any subject matter in which the United States either has
or claims to have an interest. True, the Court could entertain
the request and render the opinion after the United States
had withdrawn. But to do this, in other words, for the Court
to render an advisory opinion while the United States is not
a member is, however, a function the Court is exercising already. Manifestly, then, the United States no more subjects
itself to the influence of the advisory opinions by joining the
Court than by remaining outside. Indeed, under membership, the subjection would be actually less, because membership in itself carries a greater opportunity of control to the
State possessing it. Then, too, the universal desire to have
the United States become a member of the Court may be depended upon, in the event we should join, to induce, in all
probability, the other States not to press for an advisory opinion which the United States really would not want rendered.
In the Senate's Resolution of Adherence, and following
the recital of the five reservations are a couple of "understandings" with which also it would be contemplated that the
United States would be joining the Court. According to the
first of these, recourse to the Court for the settlement of a
difference between the United States and any other State, is
to be had only through general or special treaties concluded
between the parties in dispute. This is provided for already
in the charter Statute of the Court. No State, on signing the
Protocol of Signature, need subscribe to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction unless it wants to, although many States have
done so. The United States contemplates subscribing only to
the Court's voluntary jurisdiction, that is, the jurisdiction
assented to voluntarily by the parties themselves through general or special treaty or agreement aside from that represented
by any of the Protocols under consideration.
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The other "understanding" which the Senate prescribed,
was to the effect that adherence to the Court should not be
construed as requiring the United States to depart from its
traditional policy of not interfering with, or entangling itself
in, the political questions of policy or internal administration
of other States, or as implying a relinquishment by the United
States of its traditional attitude toward purely American
questions. There is nothing in the Protocol of Adherence
implying in the slightest degree a departure either from the
policy or the attitude mentioned, since under the Protocol the
United States could not be obliged to submit to the Court
any dispute with another State unless electing to do so, and
since it could veto the rendition even of an advisory opinion
while a member of the Court.
THE COURT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Since the present policy of the United States is to cooperate voluntarily with the League rather than to be a member,
it becomes important to inquire whether acceptance by the
United States of membership in the Court would carry with
it an agreement to be bound by the provisions of the Covenant
of the League of Nations or would otherwise create a subjection of the United States to the League.
We have considered this inquiry and answer it in the
negative.
While it was the League of Nations that under Article
14 of the Covenant brought about the organization of the
Court, it was not the League that chartered it or gave it the
breath of life. Both charter and life came directly from the
many States which, while members of the League, nevertheless, acting apart from the League, separately and independently adopted the charter Statute and by so doing brought
the Court into being.
The Court and the League are different entities or organizations. The decisions of the Court are not subject to
the control of the League. Membership in the Court is not
membership in the League or an acceptance of the provisions
of the Covenant.
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The relation between the Court and the League is, however, a close one. The common purpose of promoting international peace, together with the large degree of identity in
membership, make it so. Fifty-four states are members of
the League and fifty-two of them have signed the Protocol
of Signature (the Charter Statute) of the Court and thirtytwo of these have ratified it. There are now only two states
belonging to the Court which do not belong to the League.
The relation between Court and League is not one, however,
which need deter the United States in the slightest degree
from entering the Court.
The judges of the Court are elected by the Council and
the Assembly of the League, and their salaries are a part of
the budget of the League collected from the League's member States, but the United States, under the Protocol of Adherence, is to have in the election a voice equal to that of any
other State and is to determine the amount of its own contribution to the expenses of the Court's maintenance.
We have noted already that the Council or Assembly may
call for advisory opinions from the Court, although under
the Protocol of Adherence the United States would have a
veto power against the rendition of these opinions as long as
the United States is a member of the Court.
In the examination of the relation between the Court and
the League we now come to the subject of "sanctions", that is
to those inducements which lead the States, when litigants
before the Court, to abide by the Court's decree.
In the domestic or national courts of individual States
the usual "sanction" or inducement for exacting obedience
to the judgment of a court, is force-the force of the marshal
or sheriff and his agents, or corresponding officers.
The only "sanction" found in the Protocols themselves
by which to exact submission to the decree of the World Court
is the moral obligation and the honor of the litigant State,
whether a member of the League or not, which has submitted
its case under an agreement to abide by the result. True, there
is always the public opinion of the World-another powerful
"sanction", but this lies outside of any agreement.
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Although the Protocols contain no language calling for
any "sanction" other than that of moral obligation yet, as to
member States of the League it is clear that under Articles
13 and 16 of the League Covenant the members of the League
contemplate the possible use of economic and even military
"sanctions" under certain circumstances against one of their
own number refusing to abide by the decision of the Court.
As to States which are not members of the League but are
members of the Court, it is equally clear that no legal connection between the Court Protocols and the Covenant of the
League would make any "sanction" of economic pressure or
physical force applicable to the United States should the latter, upon adhering to the Court refuse to comply with a decision in a matter voluntarily submitted. This does not mean
that the member States of the League have not, by Article 17
of the Covenant, agreed in such wise as to contemplate the
possible use of economic and even military pressure against
a non-member of the League which, on invitation of the
Council, either refuses to submit a controversy to the Court or,
having submitted it, refuses to abide by the decision but does
the wholly unlikely thing of resorting to war instead; for there
is an agreement among the League States to that effect. But
it does mean, that the United States no more becomes a party
to that agreement contained in the Covenant, no more assumes
an obligation in respect thereto and no more subjects itself to
the League by adhering to the Court under the Protocols before us, than by not adhering at all.
WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD JOIN THE COURT

Since under the Protocol of Signature creating the Court,
the United States, although not a party to that Protocol, is
already eligible as a suitor or defendant before the Court,
the question of why the United States should become a member is a fair one. Consideration proves that eligibility is not
enough; that there should be actual membership.
The reasons for membership are two. The Court needs
the United States. The United States, from the standpoint
of enlightened self-interest, needs the Court. The process of
diverting the thought and habit of the Nations from war to a
judicial tribunal, as an agency for the settlement of interna-
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tional conflict, is a slow one at best. The adherence of the
United States means everything to. the increasing strength and
prestige of the Court and to its acceptance by all Nations as
an agency for peace. As for the self-interest of the United
States we are more likely, as a matter of human nature, to
receive exact justice from the Court, as a litigant before it,
if we appear as a member under the Protocols than if as a
foreigner under the privilege of eligibility, no matter how
graciously extended. Then too, international experience
proves that wars come not only to the original disputants but
also, as in the case of our own nation in the World War, to
neutrals whose rights the original disputants violate. The
World Court advanced in power and influence by our own
membership in it, would have a strong tendency to minimize
the frequency of the wars in which our country would be
engaged, and, therefore, to increase the security of the life,
opportunities and achievements of our people.
RECOMMENDATIONS

For these reasons and in conclusion, the committee respectfully recommends to the Denver Bar Association the
adoption of the attached Resolution for the adherence of the
United States to the World Court.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE F. DUNKLEE,
JAMES H. PERSHING,
WILL SHAFROTH,
ROGER WOLCOTT,
L. WARD BANNISTER,

Chairman.

RESOLUTION OF THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
RELATING TO THE WORLD COURT
WHEREAS, the representative of the United States at
Berne, acting under the direction of the President of the
United States, has signed the Protocol of Signature of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
Protocol of Adherence of the United States to said Protocol
of Signature, and also has signed the Protocol of Revision of
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the Statute referred to, all to the end that the United States
may become a member of said Court, and
WHEREAS, the Permanent Court of International Justice,
or World Court as it is more commonly called, is a great constructive agency for the maintenance of international peace,
needs increasing support from the public opinion of the World
and is needed in turn not only by other Nations but, from the
standpoint of enlightened self-interest, by our own Nation as
well, and
WHEREAS, the United States may now safely become a
member of said Court under the Protocols referred to without
either sacrifice of sovereignty or violation of traditional policies in international affairs,
Now, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Denver Bar
Association earnestly favors the ratification of these Protocols
by the Senate of the United States; that a copy of this Resolution, together with a copy of the report of the committee of
the Association, which is hereby approved, be sent to the Senators representing Colorado at Washington and that a copy of
the Resolution be sent to the President of the United States.*
*EIrroR's NoTm: After due consideration the above report of the committee was
approved and accepted by the Association and the resolution adopted as recommended.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS
By Ernest B. Fowler of the Denver Bar
HE existence and operation of two separate and distinct systems of courts throughout the nation gives rise
to many interesting questions of jurisdiction, brings
about many irritating conflicts and requires the application of
broad principles of comity and equity to determine whether,
under given circumstances, one system will interfere with the
process or judgments of the other.
The courts of each state have full jurisdiction of all
classes and kinds of cases known to the law, and with few exceptions, may carry through to conclusion any case instituted
in them. In the vast majority of cases the jurisdiction of the
state courts is exclusive. The federal courts covering the same
territory have exclusive jurisdiction given them in certain
specified cases enumerated in the constitution or statutes, such
as controversies between states, between citizens of the United
States and foreign states, citizens or subjects, questions of
admiralty or bankruptcy. In other classes of cases, such as
for instance where jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship, the jurisdiction may not be exclusive. Each system
has by virtue of constitutional or statutory provisions of the
state legislatures or Congress, full power and authority, both
at law and equity, to carry through any litigation once started
to its final conclusion and to give full effect to any judgments
or decrees which may be entered.
With such a dual system of courts operating in the same
territory, it is inevitable that conflicts shall arise and that one
system or the other give way.
As said by Chief Justice Taft in Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258

U. S.255:

"We live in the jurisdiction of two sovereignties, each having its own
system of courts to declare and enforce its laws in common territory. It would
be impossible for such courts to fulfil their respective functions without embarrassing conflict unless rules were adopted by them to avoid it. The people
for whose benefit these two systems are maintained are deeply interested that
each system shall be effective and unhindered in its vindication of its laws. The
situation requires, therefore, not only definite rules fixing the powers of the
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courts in cases of jurisdiction over the same persons and things in actual litigation, but also a spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote
due and orderly procedure."

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss, in the short space
available, a few of the principles which have been worked out
and the rules established as a result of 137 years of experience
under the two systems.
Congress at a very early date recognized that embarrassing situations and conflicts might arise and in 1793 the second
Congress passed a statute which has been in force ever since,
and unchanged, known sometimes as Section 720 of the Revised Statutes, or more recently as Section 265 of the Judicial
Code, which provides "Section 265. The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any
court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state, except
in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."

This language is explicit and definite and if applied literally there could be no injunctions granted in any case by a
federal court enjoining or staying proceedings in a state court,
only except in the case of the one exception noted in the statute,
namely, bankruptcy proceedings. In 1793 when this statute
was passed, all courts of equity had a well recognized right,
which had frequently been exercised, to issue writs of injunction to stay proceedings pending in court, to avoid multiplicity
of suits, to enable a defendant to avail himself of equitable
defenses or obtain some form of equitable relief, and a court
of equity of one state or country could enjoin its own citizens
from prosecuting suits in another state or country. Congress
obviously intended by this statute to limit the powers of the
federal courts which they have previously enjoyed.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent
case of Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, has said that this statute
is not a jurisdictional statute but that it is a limitation on the
equity powers of the federal court and effects the particular
form of relief that may be decreed in the particular bill before the court.
But this section does not stand alone. Section 262 provides:-
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"Section 262. * * * The Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and the District Courts shall have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."

So it has been frequently held that these various statutory
provisions must be construed together in order to give them
effect and to protect the federal jurisdiction which clearly
exists in a large class of cases, for the federal courts have
always had original cognizance of all suits of a civil nature,
either at law or equity, arising under the constitution or laws
of the United States, or where there is a controversy between
citizens of different states. And if the federal court could
not enjoin other proceedings under any circumstances, its
powers would be seriously curtailed and its power to enforce
its judgment and decrees be impaired in a most material
aspect. The federal courts would find themselves powerless
to prevent inroads on their jurisdiction made by state courts,
and see their judgments or proceedings become lifeless and
mere scraps of paper.
Consequently, it has been held that Section 265 must be
construed along with the other statutory provisions, its broad
language somewhat narrowed in its scope, and that no intention would be attributed to Congress to repeal a portion of the
power expressly given to the federal courts. Accordingly,
the statute has not been literally applied, and in unusual situations the federal courts have read into the statute other exceptions than the one expressly stated.
There are at least six classes of cases in which the federal
courts will enjoin the activities of state courts, which have
become well recognized.
I.
Probably the most familiar instance is where a suit,
having been started in a state court, has been properly removed
to the federal court. Upon removal the state court loses its
jurisdiction and any further proceedings there would be void
so the federal court will enjoin any further proceedings in
the state court. If they did not do so, the right of removal
would become a mere empty form. The federal courts early
found it necessary to give relief in such cases in order to maintain their jurisdiction which had been expressly given them
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by the removal statutes. Probably the best known case laying down this doctrine is Madisonville Traction Company vs.
St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 49 L. ed. 462.
II.
Another well settled class of cases is that where a federal
court will enjoin the enforcement of a void judgment obtained
in a state court, as for instance where the state court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The argument has been
advanced in this connection that the prohibition of Section 265
applies only to valid or legal proceedings of the state courts.
The case of Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115, is an
example of this classification, where the judgment was obtained in the state court without any notice to the defendant.
The federal court will likewise enjoin proceedings in a
state court based on a void execution. Sea Board Air Line v.
Fowler, 275 Fed. 239.
III.
Still another class of cases to which Section 265 does not
apply is the enjoining by the federal courts of the enforcement of judgments obtained in a state court by fraud or sharp
practice, such that it would be inequitable to enforce the judgment. In such cases, although the state court had jurisdiction
to enter the judgment, still the plaintiff is denied the benefits
and fruits of his efforts. Such a case was Marshallv. Holmes,
141 U. S. 589.
And injunctive relief has been granted where a judgment
was obtained through accident or mistake. National Surety
Co. v. State Bank, 120 Fed. 593.
As said in Smith v. Apple, 6 Fed. (2nd) 559:
"In short, the national courts 'have the same jurisdiction and power
to enjoin a judgrfient plaintiff from enforcing an unconscionable judgment
of a state court, which has been procured by fraud, accident or mistake, that
they have to restrain him from collecting a like judgment of a federal court'.
National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 Fed. 593, 602.

Here in such cases it has been argued that the aggrieved
party had an adequate remedy in the state courts which would
protect him, or that he could appeal the case to a higher state
court for relief. But the federal courts have held consistently
that it is not sufficient that there be a remedy in a state court-

DICTA

the remedy to be adequate must be in the federal court where
the relief is prayed. See a decision of Judge Sanborn in the
eighth Circuit,-NationalSurety Co. v. State Bank, 120 Fed.
593.
It has been argued that such a suit was in violation of
the Constitution, and a denial of full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of the state. But the courts have held
that the relief in such cases does not interfere with the state
proceeding, that the judgment is left in its full vigor, but the
plaintiff is enjoined personally from enforcing the judgment,
as the injunction acts only on the party, and not on the court;
that the "proceedings" referred to in the statute have ripened
into a judgment and are at an end, and that the suit of the
plaintiff in the federal court is an entirely new and independent suit.
In the case of void judgments, it has been said they are
completely nugatory and hence not a "proceeding" within
the prohibition of Section 265.
But such arguments are obviously an attempt to get
around and explain away the language of the statute. Jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of a judgment-it continues until the judgment is satisfied and the successful party is rewarded by getting what he started after-the
fruits of a judgment. As a practical matter the proceedings of
the state court are affected by the injunction, and its machinery
is effectually blocked. If the proceeding sought to be enjoined
is not before a court of a state, then it does not come within
the prohibition of the statute and the federal court may clearly
give relief. So bodies such as railroad or utility commissions,
which act in a legislative or administrative capacity, may be
enjoined, unless they are exercising purely judicial functions.
See Bacon v. Rutland R. R. 232 U. S. 134. Close questions
arise and nice distinctions are made in determining whether
the body is acting in a legislative or judicial capacity.
IV.
Another exception is found in the case of U. S. v. Inaba,
291 Fed. 416, where a federal court restrained a state court
from disposing of certain crops in order that the federal government, as landlord under a lease, might collect rent due and
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foreclose its landlord's lien,-an instance where the federal
court protected the property of the government at the expense
of the proceedings in the state court.
V.
Probably the most common instance of injunction occurs
where the federal court first acquires jurisdiction over specific
property and then enjoins a later proceeding affecting the res
in a state court. Here the familiar rule is applied, which is
not limited to conflicts between state and federal courts, that
the first court to obtain jurisdiction of the res shall have exclusive jurisdiction until the controversy is concluded. The
rule applies in suits to enforce liens, marshall assets, administer
trusts, liquidate insolvent estates and similar cases.
As said in Covell v. Heyman, Ill U. S. 176:
"When one takes into its jurisdiction a specific thing, that res is as
much withdrawn from the judicial power of the other as if it had been
carried physically into a different territorial sovereignty."

And the rule works both ways-if the state court first
acquires jurisdiction over the res, then the federal court cannot give relief. The case of Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193
U. S. 93, gives an example of this rule. A federal court had
adjudicated a title and decreed a sale of specific property. A
state court later attempted to attack this title and was enjoined
by the federal court.
A distinction which some courts have failed to note must
be made between proceedings in personam and in rem. If in
personam only then there may be suits pending in both state
and federal courts to obtain the same relief, going on independently without interference from the other, and although
this may inconvenience the parties, it is a question merely of
which court will first proceed to judgment-once the judgment is obtained, in either court, that court can then enjoin
further proceedings in the other.
An interesting claim was made in a recent case where
plaintiff, because of diversity of citizenship, saw fit to press
his claim in personam in the federal court. When his opponent started a later suit in the state court and was showing
ability to get speedy justice, the plaintiff sought to restrain him
on the ground that he was being deprived of a constitutional
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right to have his matter tried in the federal court. But the
Supreme Court in Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 43 Sup. Ct. Rep.
79, held that a right which may be given and taken away by
Act of Congress cannot be protected as a constitutional right;
that a plaintiff in an action in personam had no constitutional
right to a trial in the federal court, and that the federal court
would only protect its jurisdiction where a res is involved.
There is clearly a multiplicity of suits over the same claim,
but the courts have held that nevertheless the statute prevented
the court from giving the usual equitable relief in such cases.
VI.
Where the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty
by officials of a state under indictment or conviction for violation of a statute which is in violation of the federal constitution, Le federal court will stay proceedings of the state court
until it can decide the right to habeas corpus.
In Ex Parte Royall, 117 U. S. 242, it was held that under
such circumstances the federal court would discharge the
prisoner in advance of trial in the state court, where there
were special circumstances requiring immediate action. In
these habeas corpus cases Section 33 of the Federal Code is
a further aid to the court, as it provides that pending the
determination of the habeas corpus proceedings, any further
proceedings in the state court are null and void.
VII.
Another well defined exception is found in cases where
the federal court will enjoin the threatened enforcement of
a criminal statute which is in violation of the federal constitution, where property rights are being destroyed or seriously
impaired. In such cases it has been argued that the injunction against the Attorney General is a suit against the state and
therefore in violation of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. But it is now settled that such suits are not against
the state, but against individuals charged with the administration of a state law, and if that law is unconstitutional, they
have no justification for their activity. But here again, from
a practical standpoint, the state has been interfered with-as
the state can only act through its officers and agents, who are
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subjected to the process of the federal court, the state has become a party defendant and is prevented from doing what it
plans to do.
The case of Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, is the leading authority for this exception. Here the Attorney General
of the State was threatening to enforce an unconstitutional statute and he was enjoined from proceeding under the statute.
But injunction will not lie from a federal court to restrain a criminal proceeding actually pending in a state court
although there is a definite threat of a multiplicity of future
proceedings and a forfeiture of a corporate charter, as determined in the case of Foster Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
U. S. 445; 71 L. ed. 1146, reversing 9 Fed. 2nd. 176 on this
point.
In an early case, Riggs v. Johnson, 73 U. S. 6, it was
sanguinely asserted that the respective spheres of action of
the state and federal courts were as clearly marked as if the
line of division between them "was traced by landmarks and
monuments visible to the eye", and that the proceedings of
one was beyond the reach of the other. But the authorities
cited above show that the writer of this phrase was speaking
figuratively. There is a prohibition against the federal courts
interfering with state courts, but there are exceptions to the
rule, which have grown up through the years as necessity and
unusual situations have demanded relief. Yet it is generally
realized that comity and orderly administration of justice in
the great majority of cases demand that each court shall be
allowed to carry on its functions without interference from
the other.

FOUNDI
Dicta is informed that a volume of Corpus Juris has been
found, apparently sans owner and all clues. Any reader who
feels he can establish his ownership to said volume -should
notify Dicta, at 802 Midland Savings Building. Dicta suggests that readers check their sets of Corpus Juris before
claiming the above volume.

AN OUTLINE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF AN ESTATE
By FrazerArnold of the Denver Bar
ITH the modern complexities brought into most estates by taxation, the dispersion of investments in
various securities and the location of property in
various places, the following may prove of some value,
as a reminder, to any one charged with the duty of executing
the terms of a will or of administering the property of an
intestate :
LOCATE AND READ WILL:

Ascertain burial instructions.
Confer with persons familiar with decedent's affairs.
SAFEGUARD ASSETS:

Take protective measures immediately following decedent's death and prior to appointment of Executor.
Properly insure and protect both real and personal
property when necessary.
Become familiar with and protect decedent's business
interests.
Notify banks, safe deposit companies and postoffice
authorities of decedent's death.
Investigate books of account and papers.
Collect valuables and place in adequate vaults.
PROBATE:

A wholly judicial proceeding, consisting of citing and
notifying requisite parties and establishing the statutory proof by the witnesses to admit the Will, resisting attempts to contest the probate.
Apply for temporary administration if delay of probate
is apparent.
Petition for widow's allowance or support of orphan
minor children.
ASSEMBLE ASSETS:

Life insurance: procure forms and collect.
Cash: obtain tax waivers and collect.
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Household and personal effects: inventory; properly
care for, sell or otherwise dispose of, under court
order.
Securities: (1) If located in safe deposit box, remove in
presence of inheritance tax appraiser. (2)
If in
custody of others, procure tax waivers and collect.
(3) Liquidate indebtedness if held as collateral.
Interest and dividends: collect and safeguard.
Business interests: arrange for proper representation and
adequate protection.
Real estate: Obtain title papers and abstracts; inspect
and report on condition of property; learn status of
taxes, mortgages against property and leases, arrange
for management and collection of rents.
Miscellaneous assets: payments due decedent, interests
in other estates or trusts present or future. Investigate. Determine correctness of accounts, adjust conflicting claims and liquidate.
APPRAISAL: Establish values as of date of death.
Consideration of assets: Controlled by the testator's
wishes as expressed in the Will and governed by the
necessities of the estate, as follows:
Household and Personal Effects: Determine best time
and method for disposal, with special consideration
to valuable art collections, antiques, etc.
Securities: Examine desirability of investments. Determine propriety of holding or selling, with due
regard to: (a) investment powers in will, (b) market
conditions, (c) wise diversification of holdings, (d)
results of statistical research, (e) consultations with
persons well informed in particular field, (f) taxation, state and federal, (g) ultimate disposition-of
estate.
Business Interests: Exhaustive investigation, aided by
bond houses, trust companies, etc. Reach policy as
to continuance, sale or liquidation of business after
securing best information in particular field, having
due regard to testator's wishes and ultimate disposition of estate.

DICTA

Real Estate: Investigate leases, encumbrances, condition
of buildings, rental revenue, location, neighborhood,
probable developments. If sale desirable, list for
submission of offers.
CLAIMS:

(a)

Notice required by law, (b) Obtaining proper verification, (c) Rejection of improper claims.
Nature of Claims Encountered: (a) Bills for current
expenses, (b) For taxes or readjustments thereof, (c)
Unmatured subscriptions, pledges, (d) Liability as
fiduciary, (e) Family settlements, (f) Liability as
endorser or maker of notes, surety on bonds, etc., (g)
Liability as special partner or under unusual business contracts or leases.
TAXES:

Assessment and payment of modern tax liability is highly
technical. Special forms for information and return must be prepared and filed for the respective
taxing authorities.
Income Taxes:
(a)
Income before death:
(1) File necessary returns; (2) make final settlement with tax authorities for all prior years;
(3) defend all improper assessments.
(b) Income of Estate:
Arrange for distributions of income, payment
of legacies and inheritance taxes and sale
of securities in the interest of economy;
file necessary returns and pay taxes.
Inheritance Taxes:
(a)
State of domicile:
(1) Obtain waivers for transfer of securities and
valuable deposits; (2) push proceedings
for fixing tax; (3) adjust final tax payment;
(4) pay promptly to obtain discount.
(b) Foreign States:
Push proceedings for tax payment to release
affected securities for transfer.
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(c)

Federal Estate:
(1) File preliminary notice; (2) make return
and pay tax; (3) have final adjustment
after review and audit.

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE:

Payment of Legacies: (a) Learn whether any assignments
on file, (b) Pay legacies and deliver specific bequests, (c) Procure final receipt and release from
legatees, (d) Pay expenses and administration costs
and fees.
Establishment of Trust Funds: (a) Set aside securities
or cash to constitute corpus of trust, (b) Adjust income due trust fund and provide for its payment, (c)
Arrange for regular remittances to beneficiaries.
Review and Audit of the Administration-Accounting:
A detailed statement of the acts and accounts of the
executor or administrator is prepared and submitted
to the interested beneficiaries and then filed in the
County or probate Court for judicial settlement.
Upon. ratification by parties in interest and by court
decree, the balance remaining in the hands of the
personal representative is paid to the residuary legatees or heirs, as the case may be, and their receipts
therefor are taken and filed in court.

A TALE OF A TITLE
By Senator Charles S. Thomas of the Denver Bar
N the winter of 1877-8 two men, Fryer and Borden by
name, discovered a deposit of Carbonate of Lead ore rich
in silver on a modest hillock just northeast of the little
town of Leadville. They named the hill for Fryer, and their
mining claim the New Discovery. The location of the Little
Pittsburg, Winnemucca and Little Chief claims to the Eastward swiftly followed. All of them proved to be great properties, laid over the same deposit. The first two covered practically the same ground, and a battle was summarily staged
in the courts by the rival owners for the disputed area. The
Winnemucca was owned by Bissell and associates, the Little
Pittsburgh by Tabor and Rische. The latter sold his interest
to Senator Chaffee during the ensuing summer.
The Fryer Hill Deposit, which proved to be one of the
largest and richest bodies of Lead-Silver ores ever discovered,
was, until developments proved otherwise, assumed to be a
vein or lode, and since the New Discovery occupied the crest
of the hill, it was supposed to cover the apex of the vein. If
so, it would belong to Fryer and Borden throughout its depth.
Hence, the Pittsburg owners and the Winnemucca owners
were equally anxious to secure control of the New Discovery
and to conceal the fact from the others. Each, therefore,
began an active but stealthy campaign for the purchase of the
New Discovery.
Neither Fryer nor Borden regarded their claim as of
unusual value. Both were willing to sell for fifty thousand
dollars each, but as there were few buyers at the time, the
fact was not generally known. Fryer had no occupation, but
called Denver his home. Borden was in the employ of Berdell and Witherell, who owned and operated a small smelting
plant.
Soon after this situation developed, Senator Chaffee,
meeting Fryer in Denver, purchased his half interest in the
mine for $50,000, but gave the incident no publicity. Meanwhile, the Bissell interests sought to secure Borden's title by
requesting Nelson Hallock, one of his intimate friends, to conduct the negotiation. Hallock promptly visited the smelter
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for this purpose. But Borden happened at the time to be in
Denver. Berdell, guessing Hallock's purpose, which the latter admitted, informed Hallock that he was Borden's closest
friend, hence he could make a better bargain with him than
any one, and would be delighted to do so; that the only compensation he wanted or expected would be the privilege of
purchasing the ore mined from the claim at current market
rates for treatment. Hallock reported this suggestion to his
principals, who authorized him to accept it, which he did.
At this point in the narrative of events, some reference to
the character of Leadville's communications with the outside
world is desirable. All freight was hauled in and out by
wagon from the terminus of the South Park railway then at
Baileys, about 40 miles from Denver. The nearest telegraph
office was at Fairplay, 20 miles away via Mosquito Trail and
sixty miles by road. A stage line for passengers and mail
operated from the rail head stopping over night at Fairplay.
The schedule time to and from Denver was, therefore, 36
hours. Granite, then the County Seat of Lake County, was
18 miles distant from Leadville.
When Borden returned, Berdell negotiated a purchase of
his half of the New Discovery on his own account. A deed
was duly executed to him for fifty thousand dollars, for which
Berdell executed five notes for ten thousand dollars each payable every thirty days thereafter. These, with the deed, were
mailed to the First National- Bank of Denver, to be held in
escrow under the terms of the agreement.
This done, Berdell, who knew of Chaffee's purchase of
the Fryer interest, reported the transaction to Bissell, and
demanded one-eighth of the Borden half as a commission for
his services. Bissell hotly rejected the proposal and denounced
Berdell in genuine western fashion. Berdell rejoined by notifying Bissell that unless his terms were accepted within thirty
days he would offer the interest to Chaffee who would, of
course, take it over.
The Berdell Smelter was located just out of town and
directly upon the stage route. Two mornings afterwards Berdell thought he saw George W. Trimble, one of Bissell's associates, in the outgoing stage as it passed his office. He instantly
concluded that Trimble was en route to Denver to take up the
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escrow, or otherwise to forestall the Berdell ultimatum. Berdell therefore, saddled his horse and took the Mosquito Trail
to Fairplay. He arrived hours ahead of the stage. When it
drove up to the hotel Berdell, from the side of an adjoining
structure, saw Trimble leave the coach and enter the hotel.
Next morning he saw Trimble take the coach for Denver.
During the day he sent a confidential wire to the Cashier of
the Denver Bank, saying that he had concluded to pay the
Borden notes and obtain the deed attached to them at once;
that his agent had left on the morning stage and would attend
to the matter on arrival. As soon as the transaction was closed,
would the Cashier please notify him by wire with particulars?
During the course of the next day Berdell received the
requested telegram informing him that Mr. Trimble had
lifted the notes and received the deed just as Berdell had
advised. Thereupon Berdell returned to Leadville. On the
same evening after reaching home he showed Borden the telegram, giving him some explanation for the turn which affairs
had taken. He added that it was very important to him that
the conveyance should be on record the next day, and would
Mr. Borden kindly execute to him a duplicate conveyance that
he might send it right away to Granite. The unsuspecting
Mr. Borden would and did, whereupon Mr. Berdell dispatched a "pony expressman" forthwith to the County Seat
with the deed and with instructions to have it recorded and
return with it the next morning. His orders were obeyed, and
with the deed in his possession, Mr. Berdell awaited an early
call from Dr. Bissell. He did not wait until his patience was
exhausted; for Mr. Trimble lost no time in returning from
Denver. Thereupon, Bissell, armed with the escrow deed and
the Berdell notes, invaded the Berdell office, informed that
gentleman of the Denver transaction, and demanded an immediate conveyance of the Borden interest in the New Discovery mine. Should Berdell refuse, suit in attachment would
be instituted upon his notes, which had been indorsed by the
Bank to Mr. Trimble.
Berdell then disclosed his hand. He showed Bissell his
recorded deed, told Bissell how and why he had secured it and
countered by demanding a sixteenth interest in the mine and
a surrender of the notes or he would sell and convey the half

DICTA

interest to the Chaffee people. This was a knockout for Bissell. He retired for consultation and reinforcements. He
finally surrendered after several parleys. Berdell insisted that
compliance with his demand should be a final settlement of all
differences, to which Bissell yielded under protest.
The value of Berdells sixteenth was prodigious. Should
he sell to Chaffee, the latter would have control. Should Bissell obtain it he would be on a par with Chaffee. So Berdell
played the contending parties against each other until they
compromised their differences before concluding which,
Chaffee, with Bissell's approval, made a final offer to Berdell,
with the warning that he could take it or leave it. He took it.
What the amount was I never knew. For Berdell, still with
an eye to the windward, insisted that the ostensible sum to be
paid for the sixteenth interest should be $4000 and no more.
To effectuate this he dumped a lot of chips and whetstones on
Chaffee to represent the ostensible consideration for the principal part of the moneys paid him.
Shortly afterwards, the Bissell people brought suit against
Berdell to recover the value of the sixteenth interest, which,
as I recall, was fixed at fifty thousand dollars. Berdell
countered with a denial of the alleged facts, and pleaded his
$4000 sale as the actual value of the interest. At the trial all
the facts above detailed were proven, while defendant stressed
the finality of the settlement as a complete bar to the suit. The
jury returned a verdict for $4000 from which both sides appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, but reversed the law of final settlement, by accepting the negative
testimony of the plaintiffs upon the subject. This was just,
whatever the rule of the law. Those who care to read the case
will find it reported as Bissell vs. Berdell 6 Colo. 160. The
final result was followed by a passage at arms in Leadville
between Berdell and a man.. named Foss; but that is another
story. The reader will draw his own conclusion as to the
moral involved in the transaction, if any there be.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EDrrom's NO(E: It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note interesting decisions
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the new Tenth Circuit, although
such are not trial decisions, the United States District Court, the Denver District
Court, the County Court, and occasionally the Juvenile Court.)

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS-10th CIRCUIT-

Oregon Lumber Company vs. M. Terasaki, et al.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado. Decided January 4, 1930. Opinion
by Judge Phillips.
Facts.-Ben Bolt Jr. Floral Company, bankrupt, entered
into a contract to purchase from Terasaki and Kaii three
acres of land in Adams County, Colorado, for $4,000. $500.00
in cash was paid on said purchase price. Under the terms of
the contract the sellers retain title to the property until paid
in full. Contract also contained the usual standard provision
regarding forfeiture, etc. The contract was recorded. The
bankrupt immediately entered into possession of the premises
and made certain improvements thereon. The Oregon Lumber Company furnished materials for a new house erected on
the premises and filed their claim on the entire 3-acre tract
and all improvements for $2231.90 and requested a lien therefor. The Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company, one of the
defendants above, furnished materials for a new boiler and
fittings for the greenhouse already standing on the premises,
and filed their claim for $1965.00 against the improvements as
an "entire structure." When the purchaser became a bankrupt,
Terasaki and Kaii abandoned their claim of forfeiture under
the contract and filed claim of lien for $3500.00 plus interest
on account of the unpaid purchase price against the entire
property. In the proceedings to review an order of the referee
in bankruptcy, the District Court entered the following order:
1. That Terasaki and Kaii be given a prior lien on the
premises for the amount of the unpaid purchase price under
the contract plus interest.
2. That the Oregon Lumber Company be given a lien
against the 3 acres and all improvements thereon as a unit
subject to above lien.
3. That the Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company be
given a lien against the boiler and heating plant installed by
them and be permitted to remove the same.
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The Oregon Lumber Company appealed said order to
the Circuit Court of Appeals on the theory that Terasaki and
Kaii had an "interest in, the land" rather than a "recorded
mortgage," and failing to give five days notice after knowledge
of the improvements as provided in Section 6446 C. L. Colo.
1921, had no prior claim.
Held.-l. That a Court of bankruptcy is a court of
equity and is governed by the principles and rules of equity
jurisprudence.
2. A contract of sale vests equitable title to the property
in the purchaser from the date of execution, and that the vendor is a trustee of the legal title for the vendee, and the vendee
in turn is trustee of the purchase money for vendor. The
vendor therefore retains the legal title but only as security for
the purchase price. The vendor may therefore assert a lien in
a court of equity (in this instance a court of bankruptcy), and
such lien is a bona fide, recorded encumbrance under the
meaning of the provisions of Section 6446 C. L. Colo. 1921.
3. The heating plant installed by the Stearns-Roger
Manufacturing Company is not an "entire structure" under
the meaning of Section 6444 C. L. 1921, but is an integral
part of the greenhouse. The order of the District Court is
therefore affirmed as it pertains to the liens of Terasaki and
Kaii and the Lumber Company, but modified to give the
Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company only a lien equal to
that of the Lumber Company on the entire 3 acres and improvements as a unit.
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS-10th CIRCUIT-

Consolidated Lead & Zinc Company vs. Karl Corcaral.
Appeal from the District Court for the North District
of Oklahoma. Decided January 6, 1930. Opinion by Judge
Cotteral.
Facts.-Plaintiff,a minor, suing by his next friend, resided at Picher, Oklahoma. Defendant Zinc Company operated a mine and mill at said town. The premises of the
Zinc Company were a block north of the high school and
adjoined a public road traveled by many people and used
daily by school children. On the premises was a transformer
house near and in plain view of the road. There was no fence
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around said house nor did the Company maintain any guard.
The front and side doors were usually open. It was alleged
in the complaint that this transformer house was attractive and
easily accessible to children exciting their curiosity and interest, and without notice it carried a dangerous charge of electricity. Plaintiff and other boys for months had used the mine
grounds as a play ground.
On the day of the accident, plaintiff with another boy had
been playing on the premises. It was alleged and the evidence
showed that the other boy had turned on the switch in the
transformer house; that during a friendly scuffle in the transformer house, plaintiff fell on the floor and came in contact
with an uninsulated live wire on the floor. As a result he was
severely burned and both his arms were amputated.
A judgment for $15,000 was entered on a verdict for the
plaintiff. Defendant Zinc Company appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals principally on the theory:
1. That demurrer should have been sustained to the
complaint.
2. Improper instructions.
Held.-1. The demurrer was properly overruled. This
case is not like United Zinc Company vs. Britt (poisonous
pool) but is more like Railroad Company vs. Stout (turn
table) and Union Pacific Railway vs. McDonald (burning
slack).
The complaint alleged and the evidence showed an
habitual use of the premises as a play ground. The Company
knew or might have known of this fact and the plaintiff therefore must be treated as a licensee. Being a licensee the Company owed him a duty of protection against a danger unknown
to him and to which he might be attracted. This danger was
known to the Company and they could reasonably have anticipated injury.
In the petition the injury is attributed to defendant's
negligence, and it would be a fact for the jury to decide if
the resulting injury was the proximate and reasonable consequence of that negligence and could have reasonably been
foreseen by the Company.
2. The case reversed and remanded on the instructions
given because they were too broad.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EorroR's No'r-It is intended in each issue of DicrA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

CORPORATIONS -

DIRECTORS -

PREFERRED

CREDITORS--SUC-

11998-Beaver Park Co. vs. Hobson-Decided December 2, 1929.
Facts.-Beaver Park Co. was organized to take over a
former land company and an irrigation company, after the
Pueblo flood had destroyed the irrigation system and the companies were without funds to proceed. Penrose, a director,
loaned money to the company to perform the work, after the
company had tried to raise money without success. Certain
land owners had brought suit and obtained judgments against
the former water company for damages and sought to hold
the new company as successor of the old company and to have
their judgments declared superior liens to that of Penrose for
moneys he advanced and for which he took security from the
company.
Held.-An officer of a corporation, in the absence of bad
faith or fraud, has the same right to become its creditor, preferred or otherwise, as one who has no official connection
therewith. The Beaver Park Company was not a continuation of, or reincarnation of, the old company and there being
a consideration for the transfer of the assets from the old company to the new and no fraud nor merger nor consolidation,
the new company cannot be held for the debts of the old company.
Judgment Reversed.
CESSORS--No.

FORECLOSURE -

PRIORITY -

UNMATURED

INTEREST -

No.

12154-Toll vs. Colorado National Bank, et al-Decided
December 23, 1929.
Facts.-The Twin, Lakes Land and Water Company executed a deed of trust to which were attached interest coupons
paying 6 per cent. interest. At the same time they executed a
series of 1 per cent interest coupons which were not attached
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to the principal note. The original note and deed of trust
with the coupons attached became the property of the Colorado National Bank and the 1 per cent interest coupons which
were detached came into the possession of Toll as trustee.
Held.-First,in the absence of an agreement or a special
equity to the contrary, assignees holding separately several
notes secured by a mortgage or otherwise are entitled to share
pro rata and without any preference in the proceeds arising
from the sale of the securities, when insufficient to satisfy them
all, and this is true if all the notes matured on different dates,
and the assignments were made at different times. Second,
Toll was not entitled to pro rate to the extent of his interest
coupons that had not yet matured.
Judgment Affirmed and Modified.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS -

AUTOMOBILES-FORFEITURE-NO.

12199-Lindsley vs. Werner-Decided December 23, 1929.
Facts.-Lindsley sold an automobile to Walling. The
purchaser did not pay the entire purchase price, but gave back
a mortgage. The mortgage contained a covenant against the
use of the car in violation of the Federal or State intoxicating
liquor laws. Thereafter, while the car contained intoxicating liquors, an officer seized the same and was proceeding to
forfeit the car under the intoxicating liquor statutes, and the
mortgagee, who was innocent in the transaction, instituted suit
in replevin against the officer.
Held.-While the automobile is used or kept for the purpose of violating the provisions of the intoxicating liquor act,
it can be forfeited to the State, notwithstanding that there is
a chattel mortgage against it and the mortgagee was innocent
and had no knowledge of the use to which the car was being
put.*
Judgment Affirmed.
MECHANICS' LIENS-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-SUBROGATION-

11906-Howard vs. Fisher-DecidedDecember 9, 1929.
Facts.-Howard owned five lots which she mortgaged to
The Colorado Mortgage Company. Thereafter she hired
ESTOPPEL-NO.

*EDITOR'S QUAERE: Would this be true if the mortgagee was not a party to the
action and was never notified of the seizure?
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Brendle and Brent to build an apartment house on them, and
they gave a contractors' bond with The National Surety Company as surety. Brendle and Brent defaulted and the Surety
Company undertook the work, which it continued for a time,
then dropped. It paid certain mechanics' lien claimants and
assignments of their liens were taken in the name of Smith,
the Surety Company's Vice-President. After work had been
begun the Midland Company paid off the Mortgage Company's loan and took a new mortgage; after suit had been
started one Auslender bought Howard's interest in the property, but the trial Court refused to make Auslender a party.
Held.-The Surety Company was estopped to assert the
claims under the assignments of the mechanic's lien. The
Midland Company's loan is inferior to the mechanic's lien
claims, but it is entitled to the protection of the contractor's
bond. Auslender should have been made a party to the proceedings.
Judgment Affirmed in Partand Reviyed in Part.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-ORDINANCE-FORTUNE

TELLERS

-No. 12496-Watson vs. City of Denver-Decided December 23, 1929.
Facts.-Watson was charged with the violation of section 1202 of the Municipal Code of Denver, was found guilty
and was fined. She appealed to the County Court where she
was again found guilty and fined apparently on the theory that
she was a fortune teller without having procured a license.
The complaint against her was that she violated Section 1202.
Section 1202 defined fortune tellers and clairvoyants but contained no penalty.
Held.-Section 1202 of the Municipal Code creates no
offense. The complaint states no offense. The verdict found
Helen Watson guilty of no offense. Hence the judgment
cannot stand.
Judgment Reversed.
1226--Kochiovelos vs.
Kochiovelos Live Stock Co. et al.-Decided December 16,
1929.
Facts.-This was a suit by one brother against another

RECEIVERSHIP-LACK OF PROOF-No.
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and a company seeking the appointment of a receiver of the
corporate property, a dissolution of the corporation, a disposition of the assets of the company and for an accounting.
Judgment below was rendered for the defendant.
Held.-The evidence failed to sustain the plaintiff's allegations for receivership and accounting.
Judgment Affirmed.
No. 12260 - Kritzmanich vs. Spehar, Administrator-DecidedDecember 16,
1929.
Facts.-The administrator brought an action in replevin
in the District Court to recover certain cattle, horses, and miscellaneous farm equipment. Defendants were the two eldest
of five sons of the deceased. The sole issue involved was
whether the personal property was owned by the deceased at
the time of his death, or by the defendants. There was conflicting evidence, and the trial court entered judgment for
possession for the plaintiff.
Held.-On the question of possession or ownership, the
evidence was conflicting, and there was sufficient, proper, substantial, and credible evidence from which the Court had the
right to determine that the property involved in this suit was
all owned by the deceased. Judgment of the trial court based
upon such evidence will not be disturbed by this court.
Judgment Affirmed.
REPLEVIN -

CONFLICTING EVIDENCE -

12446-In
re Last Will of Schmidt, Deceased, et al. vs. DillinghamDecided December 16, 1929.
Facts.-A beneficiary under the will sought to have it
admitted to probate. Dillingham contested its provisions.
Proponent demurred and the Court sustained the demurrer.
Contestant elected to stand and appealed to the Supreme
Court, which reversed the case, with directions to overrule
the demurrer. The case went back, the trial court overruled
the demurrer, and on motion, later struck out the answer on
the ground that the matters set forth in the answer had been
fully adjudicated by the Supreme Court in the former appeal.
WILLS-CONTEST-FORMER ADJUDICATION-No.

DICTA

Held.-For the lower Court to strike an answer without
giving an opportunity to amend was a drastic action; but in
this particular case, the answer consisted of a repetition of
pleas formerly made and already adjudicated, and under such
circumstances the Court did not err in adopting such drastic
action.
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CASUAL EMPLOYEES-NOTICE

12320-Comerford vs. Carr et al.-Decided January 6, 1930.
Facts.-Comerford, the employer, was engaged in a rendering business and Carr the employee, testified that he was
hurt while working for Comerford, that he ran a stone into
his hand and was poisoned. The employer at different times
had more than four employees working for him but they were
not doing the same work, as Carr the injured employee was
engaged in loading cars. Carr was awarded compensation.
Held.-( 1) Carr was not required to file notice claiming
compensation because he was paid compensation during the
time he was off work. (2) He was injured in the course of his
employment. (3) Comerford had more than four employees
working for him. (4) The other employees were not casual
employees because they were employed in the usual course of
trade of the employer. (5) These other employees were engaged in a common employment. The mere fact that they
were engaged in loading the cars was not a different employment. This was necessary for the conduct of the employer's
business.
Judgment Affirmed.
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